Reasoning on belief using fuzzy logic (as present in some prominent medical fuzzy expert systems) is examined from the point of view of formal logic.
Introduction
This is a working paper describing a research program in a more or less initial stage of development. Its aim is -to stress the di erence between vagueness (fuzziness) on the one hand and uncertainty as degree of belief on the other hand (this di erence seems to be disregarded in some medical expert systems) -to call the reader's attention to a very elegant and simple formal logical system of fuzzy logic -to present some observations and results on possibilities of handling uncertainty (in particular, probability) in fuzzy logic.
Let us start with the distinction (made by Professor Zadeh) between fuzzy logic on broad and narrow sense, the broad sense being \everything concerning fuzziness" and the narrow being \the underlying formal logical calculi" (including many-valued systems, possibly with non-standard quanti ers as \usually"etc.). Indeed, many-valued logic has proved to be a very comfortable formal home for fuzzy logic. A very crucial feature of many v alued (propositional) logic is its truth-functionality: the truth degree of a compound formula is determined by the truth-degrees of its component. Various systems di er in how the truth degrees of components determine the truth degree of the compound formula (recall the theory of t-norms and conorms as possible semantics of conjunction and disjunction) but they agree in the truth-functionality. I n c o n tradiction with this, degrees of belief are not truth functional e.g. it is clear that we cannot compute the probability o f A & B (A B being crisp propositions) from probabilities of A and of B since P(A & B) i s not a function of P(A) P (B) (if no additional assumptions of independence etc. are made). This distinction has been observed by several authors, see e.g. 2, 3] . Recall the attempts of probabilistic justi cation of MYCIN-like systems that turned out to be pseudoprobabilistic, (cf. 7, 6] ).
Disregarding the di erence between truth degree of fuzzy propositions (admitting a truth-functional calculus) and degrees of belief (e.g. probabilities) of crisp notions (which are inherently not truth-functional) brings the danger of wrong conclusions and conceptual illness, if not justi ed by some theoretical foundations. This is why some well-known and successful medical expert systems appear to need careful theoretical analysis which either encovers some deeper ways of interpretation of the calculus used or will result into some recommendations of re-consideration. Such analysis is our future plan here we present some preliminary considerations that are hoped to be of independent i n terest.
Let us close this introduction with two examples of rules in existing systems. Our rst example is from PNEUMON-IA, a medical expert system based on the shell MILORD 4] There are nine \linguistic certainty v alues" like quite possible, almost sure etc. formally, they are rst handled as truth-modi ers (hedges) but later they seem to be treated as truth-degrees in a nine-valued fuzzy logic. In the former case, the question may be posed if a terminology, referring to truth rather than certainty (hence quite true, almost absolutely true) would not be more adequate in the latter, our discussion on a truth-functional treatment of degrees of certainty m a y a p p l y . Is, for example, \bacterial disease" a crisp notion, either present or absent a n d w e h a ve some belief (\possible") on its presence or is it a fuzzy notion which m a y be more or less true so that it is modi able by a hedge \possible"? (The authors plan Let us be explicit in saying that we do not question the quality of practical results obtained by these systems which m a y w ell be very high due to careful \tuning" as well as to the simplicity of deduction patterns used but the question of a theoretical justi cation remains.
The main question of this paper reads as follows: It is tempting to deal with beliefs (probabilities) of crisp propositions as if they were truth degrees of some fuzzy propositions and to deal with conditional probabilities as if they were truth degrees of some implications. Can one do this? If so, how? What can one conclude?
Let us mention two related papers. First 9] discusses the problem of probabilities of fuzzy propositions and fuzzy propositions on probabilities (like \the probability o f p is large"). 1] discusses, among other things, inference mechanisms of fuzzy logic that derive upper and lower bounds for degrees of (un)certainty. W e shall present a result which is more speci c concerning the calculus (just a variant o f Lukasiewicz's logic) but more general concerning the proof mechanism (arbitrary graded proof allowed).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we s u r v ey a simpli ed version of Pavelka's fuzzy logic, needed in following sections, and introduce some notational conventions. In Section 3 and 4 we o er two approaches to the problem of dealing with degrees of belief (probabilities) of crisp propositions as with truth degrees of some (other) fuzzy propositions. In Section 5 we conclude with some remark. A graded formula is a pair (' r) where ' is a formula and r 2 0 1] is rational. A fuzzy theory is a mapping associating to each formula a rational number -its degree of being an axiom (fuzzy set of formulas, rational-valued, or a certain set of graded formulas). In particular, we h a ve the fuzzy theory of logical axioms.
Logical axioms are (i) Rose-Rosser's axioms (all in degree 1) Note that this logic has a natural semantics and a completeness theorem (saying that the truth degree of ' in T equals to the provability degree of ' in T) see 5] for de nitions and details. Here we only stress the general notion of a graded proof, fully analogous to the notion of proof in crisp logic.
We shall discuss general many-valued logics but RPL will be our outstanding example.
To discuss our main question, let us distinguish propositional variables and connectives of crisp (two-valued) logic (p q : : : ; \ !) and of fuzzy logic f p f q : : : : & or^ _ or _ or both], !). Assume a fuzzy logic to be given, i.e. choice of truth values, connectives and their truth tables. Investigate graded formulas (i.e. pairs (' ) where ' is a formula and a truth degree) and assume some sound fuzzy logical axiom system (if (' ) is an axiom then each e v aluation e of atoms satis es e(') ). Assume we have a conjunction & and implication ! such that the fuzzy modus ponens is sound: for each e if e(') and e(' ! ) then e( ) & . This is in particular the case of RPL. But a sound deductive system with modus ponens is available for many many-valued logics. Note that each graded formula (' ) de nes some conditions on the values of atoms of ' in an evaluation e necessary and su cient to the fact that e(') . E.g. e(p ! q) in Lukasiewicz's logic i e(p) & e(q).
Direct translation
One just identi es propositional variables of crisp logic with those of fuzzy logic and interprets each formula ' of fuzzy logic by its crisp counterpart c('). (Clearly, v arious formulas non-equivalent in fuzzy logic may h a ve counterparts equivalent in crisp logic, notably ' & and '^ are not equivalent in fuzzy logic but both go to ' \ .) We w ork with fuzzy theories T in the above sense T is a fuzzy set of formulas. We write (' ) 2 T for T(') = .
Let WPL (weak Pavelka's logic) stand for RPL without truth constants and corresponding axioms and deduction rules, i.e. just Lukasiewicz's logic but with fuzzy theories.
Let P be a probability on crisp formulas a fuzzy theory T respects P if for each ' P(c(')) T(').
Fact. If T respects P and T`w (' r) ( i . e . T proves (' r) in WPL) then P(c(')) r. Proof standard (just check modus ponens: if P(A) r and P(:A _ B) s then
Example. If T = f(p ) (q )g 1=2 < < 1 t h e n T`w (p & q & ) (where & is max(0 2 ; 1)), also T`w (p^q & ) but not T`w (p^q)( ). On the other hand, T`(p^q ) (in RPL) due to the completeness theorem. This fact relies heavily on Lukasiewicz's implication in next section we p r e s e n t a more general approach.
Linguistic (cautious) translation
We associate with each crisp formula ' a fuzzy propositional variable f'(read: ' i s PROBABLE, o r PROBABILITY OF ' i s H I G H ). This is a fuzzy proposition give n a j o i n t probability P, w e are free to de ne e(f') = P('), i.e. assign P(') a s the truth-value of f'. We h a ve f(:') : f(') ( i . e . the last formula has value 1 under the evaluation e above but, on the contrary f(' ! ) (f'! f ) need not have v alue 1 and likely for other binary connectives. Once more: the formulas ' i s : : f p n ) ) 2 T implies that the expression '(P(p 1 ) : : : P (p n )) is caution: we do NOT mean P('(p 1 : : : : p n )) !!] and T proves ( (fp 1 : : : f p n ) ) t h e n w e k n o w (P (p 1 ) : : : P (p n )) in particular, if T proves (fq ) for an atom q, then we k n o w P(q) .
Observe that this is true for any fuzzy logic satisfying our minimal conditions, not just for Lukasiewicz! Here we get in fact only information on probabilities of atoms one has to remember that e.g. the rule ((fp& fq) ! fr 0:9) is understood as saying P(p) & P(q) & 0 :9 P(r), not anything about conditional probabilities.
5 Concluding remarks (1) Fuzzy probabilistic logic. If we allow all atoms PROBABLE ' (for each ', brie y P B L E') w e m a y formulate axioms sound for each probability, e . g .
Can we h a ve an axiomatization probabilistically complete in some sense? For a fuzzy theory T whose atoms are P B L Ep for p atomic we h a ve some trivial observations: assume T is consistent, then it has a model -evaluation e respecting all the axioms (now w e w ork in the logic RPL). But then we m a y assume that e(P B L Ep i ) = P(p i ) for some probability P since we m a y freely choose probabilities of propositional atoms the axioms say nothing on the probabilities of compound formulas.
(2) Possibilities of use in expert systems If we think in probabilistic terms in expert systems we are mainly interested in conditional probabilities: we h a ve a piece E of knowledge (information) and are interested in P(HjE), H being e.g. a hypothesis. E may for example imply p 1 t h e n P(p 1 jE) = 1.On the contrary, w e h a ve stressed that our use of truth degrees as expressing inequalities concerning expressions built from (unconditional) probabilities of atomic formulas does not allow us to express general conditional probabilities. Is there any help?
We suggest the following: Do not think of a knowledge base as of one unconditional probability on atoms but on a system of conditional probabilities P i (: : : ) = P(: : : jE i ), i = 1 : : : n , where E i are some possible pieces of evidence. Assume further that each of the probabilities P i satis es the conditions expressed by the knowledge base but a single P i may of course satisfy more, e.g. it may be the case that P 1 (p) = 1. (This may be given by t h e a vailable data.) Caution: we do not assume that the E i run over all possible events by which w e m a y conditionalize these are just evidences expected or admitted or considered in uses of the knowledge base. For example if our knowledge base consists of the single formula p ! q with the truth value 0.8 then we assume that for all i we h a ve P i (p) & 0 :8 P i (q), thus an E implying p & :q and of positive probability cannot be one of E i 's. We do not claim that this understanding of a fuzzy knowledge base is to be recommended we o n l y s a y t h a t if one wants the truth values of atoms to be their probabilities then ours is one possible way h o w t o d o t h a t .
(3) Our last remark: we repeatedly stress the working character of the paper. Nevertheless, we hope that it might contribute to better understanding of the problem of dealing with beliefs in fuzzy logic and serve as a starting point of theoretical (logical) analysis of various particular approaches, not necessarily only those mentioned above.
